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Abstract. We present an index-calculus algorithm for the computation
of discrete logarithms in the Jacobian of hyperelliptic curves dened
over nite elds. The complexity predicts that it is faster than the Rho
method for genus greater than 4. To demonstrate the eÆciency of our
approach, we describe our breaking of a cryptosystem based on a curve
of genus 6 recently proposed by Koblitz.
1 Introduction
The use of hyperelliptic curves in public-key cryptography was rst proposed by
Koblitz in 1989 [24]. It appears as an alternative to the use of elliptic curves [23]
[31], with the advantage that it uses a smaller base eld for the same level of
security. Several authors have given ways to build hyperelliptic cryptosystems
eÆciently. The security of such systems relies on the diÆculty of solving the
discrete logarithm problem in the Jacobian of hyperelliptic curves. If an algo-
rithm tries to solve this problem performing \simple" group operations only, it
was shown by Shoup [39] that the complexity is at least 
(
p
n), where n is the
largest prime dividing the order of the group. Algorithms with such a complex-
ity exist for generic groups and can be applied to hyperelliptic curves, but are
still exponential. The Pollard Rho method and its parallel variants are the most
important examples [34], [46], [17].
For the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem, there are some particular
cases where a solution can be found with a complexity better than O(
p
n). See
[30], [38], [40], [37]. Similar cases were discovered for hyperelliptic curves [14],
[35]. However they are very particular and can be easily avoided when designing
a cryptosystem.
In 1994, Adleman, DeMarrais and Huang [1] published the rst algorithm
(ADH for short) to compute discrete logs which runs in subexponential time
when the genus is suÆciently large compared to the size of the ground eld.
This algorithm was rather theoretical, and some improvements to it were done.
Flassenberg and Paulus [13] implemented a sieve version of this algorithm, but
?
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the consequences for cryptographical applications is not clear. Enge [11] im-
proved the original algorithm and gave a precise evaluation of the running time,
but did not implement his ideas. Muller, Stein and Thiel [32] extended the re-
sults to the real quadratic congruence function elds. Smart and Galbraith [16]
also gave some ideas in the context of the Weil descent, following ideas of Frey;
they dealt with general curves (not hyperelliptic).
Our purpose is to present a variant of existing index-calculus algorithms like
ADH or Hafner-McCurley [19], which allowed us to break a cryptosystem based
on a curve of genus 6 recently proposed by Koblitz. The main improvement
is due to the fact that the costly HNF computation in classical algorithms is
replaced by that of the kernel of a sparse matrix. A drawback is that we have
to assume that the order of the group in which we are working is known. This
is not a constraint in a cryptographical context, because the knowledge of this
order is preferable to build protocols. But from a theoretical point of view it
diers from ADH or Hafner-McCurley algorithm where the order of the group
was a byproduct of the discrete logarithm computation (in fact the aim of the
HNF computation was to nd the group structure).
We will analyse our method for small genus and show that it is faster than
the Pollard Rho method as soon as the genus is strictly greater than 4. Indeed its
complexity is O(q
2
) where q is the cardinality of the base eld. We will explain
below some consequences for the choice of the parameters, curve and base eld,
when building a cryptosystem.
Moreover, the presence of an automorphism of order m on the curve can be
used to speed up the computation, just as in the Rho method [9] [17] [48]. This
is the case in almost all the examples in the literature. The gain in the Rho
method is a factor
p
m, but the gain obtained here is a factor m
2
, which is very
signicant in practice.
The organization of the paper is as follows: in section 2 after some generalities
on hyperelliptic curves, our algorithm is described. It is analyzed in section 3,
and in section 4 we explain how the presence of an automorphism can help.
Finally the section 5 gives some details on our implementation and the results
of our experiments with Koblitz's curve.
2 Description of the Algorithm
2.1 Hyperelliptic Curves
We give an overview of the theory of hyperelliptic curves. More precise state-
ments can be found in [24], [4], [15]. We will restrict ourselves to the so-called
imaginary quadratic case.
A hyperelliptic curve C of genus g over a eld K is a smooth plane projective
curve which admits an aÆne equation of the form y
2
+h(x)y = f(x), where f is
a polynomial of degree 2g + 1, and h is a polynomial of degree at most g, both
with coeÆcients in K .
A divisor on the curve C is a nite formal sum of points of the curve. The
set of all divisors yield an abelian group denoted by Div(C). For each divisor
D =
P
i
n
i
P
i
2 Div(C), where the P
i
are points on the curve, we dene the degree
of D by deg(D) =
P
i
n
i
. The set of all divisors of degree zero is a sub-group of
Div(C) denoted by Div
0
(C).
For each function '(x; y) on the curve, we can dene a divisor denoted by
div(') by assigning at each point P
i
of the curve the value n
i
equal to the
multiplicity of the zero if '(P
i
) = 0, or the opposite of the multiplicity of the
pole if the function is not dened at P
i
. It can be shown that the sum is nite,
and moreover that the degree of such a divisor is always zero. The set of all
divisors built from a function a subgroup of Div
0
(C) denoted by P(C) and we
call these divisors principal. The Jacobian of the curve C is then dened by the
quotient group Jac(C) = Div(C)
0
=P(C).
If the base eld of the curve is a nite eld with cardinality q, then the
Jacobian of the curve is a nite abelian group of order around q
g
. The Hasse-Weil
bound gives a precise interval for this order: (
p
q 1)
2g
 #Jac(C)  (
p
q+1)
2g
.
In [4], Cantor gave an eÆcient algorithm for the computation of the group
law.We do not recall his method, but we recall the representation of the elements.
Proposition 1 In every class of divisors in Jac(C), there exists an unique divi-
sor D = P
1
+   +P
g
 g1, such that for all i 6= j, P
i
and P
j
are not symmetric
points. Such a divisor is called reduced, and there is a unique representation of D
by two polynomials [u; v], such that deg v < deg u  g, and u divides v
2
+hv f .
In this representation, the roots of the polynomial u are exactly the abscissae
of the points which occur in the reduced divisor.
The group Jac(C) can now be used in cryptographical protocols based on the
discrete logarithm problem, for example DiÆe-Hellman or ElGamal's protocols.
The security relies on the diÆculty of the following problem.
Denition 1 The hyperelliptic discrete logarithm problem takes on input a
hyperelliptic curve of given genus, an element D
1
of the Jacobian, its order n,
and another element D
2
in the subgroup generated by D
1
. The problem is to nd
an integer  modulo n such that D
2
= :D
1
.
2.2 Smooth Divisors
Like any index-calculus method, our algorithm is based on the notions of smooth-
ness, and prime elements. We will recall these notions for divisors on hyperelliptic
curves, which were rst dened in ADH.
Denition 2 With the polynomial representation D = [u; v], a divisor will be
said to be prime if the polynomial u is irreducible over F
q
.
For a prime divisor D, when there is no possible confusion with the degree of
D as a divisor (which is always zero), we will talk about the degree of D instead
of the degree of u.
Proposition 2 A divisor D of Jac(C) represented by the polynomials [u; v] is
equal to the sum of prime divisors [u
i
; v
i
], where the u
i
are the prime factors of
u.
Now we can give the smoothness denition. Let S be an integer called the
smoothness bound.
Denition 3 A divisor is said to be S-smooth if all its prime divisors are of
degree at most S. When S = 1, a 1-smooth divisor will be a divisor for which
the polynomial u splits completely over F
q
.
The case S = 1 is the most important for two reasons: the rst one is that for
a relatively small genus (say at most 9), and a reasonable eld size, this choice is
the best in practice. The second one is that if we want to analyze our algorithm
for a xed g and a q tending to innity, this is also the good choice.
The denition of a smooth divisor can be seen directly on the expression of
D as a sum of points of the curve. Note that a divisor dened over F
q
is dened
by being invariant under the Galois action. But it does not imply that the points
occuring in it are dened over F
q
; they can be exchanged by Galois. Hence an
equivalent denition of smoothness is given by the following proposition.
Proposition 3 A divisor D = P
1
+    + P
g
  g1 is S-smooth if and only if
each point P
i
is dened over an extension F
q
k
with k  S.
We dene also a factor basis, similar to the one used for classical discrete log
problem over F

p
.
Denition 4 The factor basis, denoted by G
S
, is the set of all the prime divisors
of degree at most S. For S = 1 we simply write G.
In the following, we will always take S = 1 and we will say `smooth divisor'
for 1-smooth divisor.
2.3 Overview of the Algorithm
For the sake of simplicity, we will suppose that the Jacobian of the curve has
an order which is almost prime and that we have to compute a discrete log in
the subgroup of large prime order (this is always the case in cryptography). Let
n = ord(D
1
) be this prime order, and D
2
be the element for which we search
the log.
We introduce a pseudo-random walk (as in [45]) in the subgroup generated
by D
1
: Let R
0
= 
0
D
1
+ 
0
D
2
be the starting point of the walk, where R
0
is
the reduced divisor obtained by Cantor's algorithm, and 
0
and 
0
are random
integers. For j from 1 to r, we compute random divisors T
(j)
= 
(j)
D
1
+
(j)
D
2
.
The walk will then be given by R
i+1
= R
i
+T
(H(R
i
))
, where H is a hash function
from the subgroup generated by D
1
to the interval [1; r]. This hash function is
assumed to have good statistical properties; in practice, it can be given by the
last bits in the internal representation of the divisors. Once the initialization is
nished, we can compute a new pseudo-random element R
i+1
at the cost of one
addition in the Jacobian. Moreover at each step we get a representation of R
i+1
as 
i+1
D
1
+ 
i+1
D
2
, where 
i+1
and 
i+1
are integers modulo n.
The classical  method is to wait for a collision R
i
1
= R
i
2
, which will yield
the discrete logarithm  =  (
i
1
 
i
2
)=(
i
1
 
i
2
) mod n. We can however make
use of the smooth divisors. For each R
i
of the random walk, test its smoothness.
If it is smooth, express it on the factor basis, else throw it away. Thus we extract
a subsequence of the sequence (R
i
) where all the divisors are smooth. We denote
also by (R
i
) this subsequence. Hence we can put the result of this computation
in a matrix M , each column representing an element of the factor basis, and
each row being a reduced divisor R
i
expressed on the basis: for a row i, we have
R
i
=
P
k
m
ik
g
k
, where M = (m
ik
). We collect w + 1 rows in order to have
a (w + 1)  w matrix. Thus the kernel of the transpose of M is of dimension
at least 1. Using linear algebra, we nd a non-zero vector of this kernel, which
corresponds to a relation between the R
i
's. Then we have a family (
i
) such that
P
i

i
R
i
= 0. Going back to the expression of R
i
in function of D
1
and D
2
, we
get:
P
i

i
(
i
D
1
+ 
i
D
2
) = 0, and then
 =  
P
i

i

i
P
i

i

i
:
The discrete logarithm is now found with high probability (the denominator is
zero with probability 1=n).
We summarize this algorithm in the gure 1.
2.4 Details on Critical Phases
In the rst step, we have to build the factor basis, and for that, we have to nd,
if it exists, a polynomial v corresponding to a given irreducible u. This can be
rewritten in solving an equation of degree 2 over F
q
, which can be done quickly.
The initialization of the random walk is only a matter of operations in the
group; after that, computing each random divisor R
i
requires a single operation
in the group.
One crucial point is to test the smoothness of a divisor, i.e. to decide if a
polynomial of degree g (the u of the divisor) splits completely on F
q
. A way to
do that is to perform the beginning of the factorization of u, which is called DDF
(stands for distinct degree factorization). By computing gcd(X
q
 X;u(X)), we
get the product of all the prime factors of u of degree 1. Thus if the degree of
this product is equal to the degree of u, it proves that u splits completely on F
q
.
In the case where a smooth divisor is detected, the factorization can be
completed, or a trial division with the elements of the basis can be performed.
The linear algebra is the last crucial point. The matrix obtained is sparse,
and we have at most g terms in each row. Then sparse technique like Lanczos's
[27] or Wiedemann's [47] algorithm can be used, in order to get a solution in
time quadratic in the number of rows (instead of cubic by Gaussian elimination).
Some other optimizations can be done to speed up the computation. They
will be described in section 5.
Input: A divisor D
1
of a curve of genus g over F
q
, of prime order n =
ord(D
1
), a divisor D
2
2 hD
1
i, and a parameter r.
Output: An integer  such that D
2
= D
1
.
1. /* Build the factor basis G */
For each monic irreducible polynomial u
i
over F
q
of degree 1, try to nd
v
i
such that [u
i
; v
i
] is a divisor of the curve. If there is a solution, store
g
i
= [u
i
; v
i
] in G (we only put one of the two opposite divisors in the
basis).
2. /* Initialization of the random walk */
For j from 1 to r, select 
(j)
and 
(j)
at random in [1::n], and compute
T
(j)
:= 
(j)
D
1
+ 
(j)
D
2
.
Select 
0
and 
0
at random in [1::n] and compute R
0
:= 
0
D
1
+ 
0
D
2
.
Set k to 1.
3. /* Main loop */
(a) /* Look for a smooth divisor */
Compute j := H(R
0
), R
0
:= R
0
+T
(j)
, 
0
:= 
0
+
(j)
mod n, and

0
:= 
0
+ 
(j)
mod n.
Repeat this step until R
0
= [u
0
(z); v
0
(z)] is a smooth divisor.
(b) /* Express R
0
on the basis G */
Factor u
0
(z) over F
q
, and determine the positions of the factors in
the basis G. Store the result as a row R
k
=
P
m
ik
g
i
of a matrix
M = (m
ik
).
Store the coeÆcients 
k
= 
0
and 
k
= 
0
.
If k < #G+ 1, then set k := k + 1, and return to step 3.a.
4. /* Linear algebra */
Find a non zero vector (
k
) of the kernel of the transpose of the matrix
M . The computation can be done in the eld Z=nZ.
5. /* Solution */
Return  =  (
P

k

k
)=(
P

k

k
) mod n. (If the denominator is zero,
return to step 2.)
Fig. 1. Discrete log algorithm
3 Analysis
3.1 Probability for a Divisor to Be Smooth
The following proposition gives the proportion of smooth divisors and then the
probability of smoothness in a random walk. This is a key tool for the complexity
analysis.
Proposition 4 The proportion of smooth divisors in the Jacobian of a curve of
genus g over F
q
tends to 1=g! when q tends to innity.
Proof: This proposition is based on the Hasse-Weil bound for algebraic curves:
the number of points of a curve of genus g over a nite eld with q elements is
equal to q+1 with an error of at most 2g
p
q, i.e. for large enough q we can neglect
it. Moreover the cardinality of its Jacobian is equal to q
g
with an error bounded
by approximatively 2gq
g 
1
2
. Here the approximation holds when q is suÆciently
large compared to 4g
2
, which is the case in the applications considered.
To evaluate the proportion of smooth divisors, we consider the number of
points of the curve over F
q
which is approximatively q. Now, the smooth divisors
of the Jacobian are in bijection with the g-multiset of points of the curve: we
have q
g
=g! smooth divisors, and the searched proportion is 1=g!. 2
3.2 Complexity
The complexity of the algorithm will be exponential in the size of q, so we will
count the number of operations which can be done in polynomial time. These
operations are of four types: we denote by c
J
the cost of a group operation in
the Jacobian, c
q
the cost of an operation in the base eld, c
q;g
the cost of an
operation on polynomials of degree g over the base eld, and c
n
the cost of an
operation in Z=nZ, where n  q
g
is the order of the Jacobian. We consider the
enumeration of steps in gure 1.
Step 1. For the building of the factor basis, we have to perform q times (i.e. the
number of monic irreducible polynomial of degree 1) a resolution of an equation
of degree 2 over F
q
. Hence the complexity of this phase is O(qc
q
).
Step 2. The initialization of the random walk is only a polynomial number of
simple operations. Hence we have O((logn)c
J
) for this step.
Step 3. We have to repeat #G = O(q) times the steps 3.a. and 3.b.
Step 3.a. The computation of a new element of the random walk costs an addi-
tion in the Jacobian and two additions modulo n, and the test for its smoothness
costs a rst step of DDF. By proposition 4, we have to compute g! divisors on
average before getting a smooth one and going away from step 3.a. Hence the
cost of this step is O(g!(c
J
+ c
n
+ c
q;g
)).
Step 3.b. The nal splitting of the polynomial in order to express the divisor
on the factor basis can not be proved to be deterministic polynomial (though
it is very fast in practice). For the analysis, we can then suppose that we do a
trial division with all the elements of the basis. This leads to a complexity of
O(qc
q;g
).
Hence the complexity of step 3. is O(qg!(c
J
+ c
n
+ c
q;g
)) +O(q
2
c
q;g
).
Step 4. This linear algebra step consists in nding a vector of the kernel in
a sparse matrix of size O(q), and of weight O(gq); the coeÆcient are in Z=nZ.
Hence Lanczos's algorithm provides a solution with cost O(gq
2
c
n
).
Step 5. This last step requires only O(q) multiplications modulo n, and one
inversion. Hence the complexity is O(qc
n
).
Finally, the overall complexity of the algorithm isO(g!qc
J
)+O((g!q+gq
2
)(c
n
+
c
q;g
))+O(qc
q
). Now, by Cantor's algorithm c
J
is polynomial in g log q, and clas-
sical algorithm on nite elds and polynomials give c
n
polynomial in n = g log q,
cq
polynomial in log q and c
q;g
polynomial in g log q. Hence all these operations
can be done in time bounded by a polynomial in g log q.
Theorem 1 The algorithm requires O(q
2
+ g!q) polynomial time operations in
g log q and if one considers a xed genus g, the algorithm takes time O(q
2
log

q).
4 Using Automorphisms on the Curve
4.1 Curves with Automorphisms in the Literature
When buiding a cryptosystem based on a hyperelliptic curve, it is preferable
to know the order of the Jacobian of this curve. Indeed, some protocols use the
group order; moreover it is necessary to be sure that it is not smooth. For elliptic
curves, the Schoof-Elkies-Atkin algorithm allows to compute quickly this order
for random curves (see [29] [28] [22] ). For random hyperelliptic curves, a similar
polynomial time algorithm exists [33], however it is still unusable in practice (see
recent progress on this subject [21] [43]). That is the reason why the curves that
we can nd in the literature are very particular: they are built in such a way
that the order of their Jacobian is easy to compute.
A rst way to build such curves is to take a curve dened over a small nite
eld F
q
. It is then possible to deduce the Zeta function (and hence the order)
of the Jacobian on the large eld F
q
n
from the Zeta function of the Jacobian
on the small eld. This construction provides then the so-called Frobenius au-
tomorphism dened by x 7! x
q
, which can be applied to each coordinate of a
point of the curve and gives therefore an automorphism of order n.
Another construction, which is a bit harder than the previous (see [42] [7]
[3], comes from the theory of complex multiplication. This theory allows to
build a curve starting from its ring of endomorphisms. In some cases, this ring
contains units of nite order, and then there is an automorphism on the curve
corresponding to this unit.
In table 1 we give some examples of curves found in the literature with non
trivial automorphisms, and the order obtained by combining them together with
the hyperelliptic involution.
Author Equation of curve Field Automorphisms Order
Koblitz [24], [25] Y
2
+ Y = X
2g+1
+X F
2
n
Frobenius 2n
Y
2
+ Y = X
2g+1
F
2
n
Frobenius 2n
Buhler Koblitz [3] Y
2
+ Y = X
2g+1
F
p
with mult by 
2g+1
2(2g + 1)
Chao et al. [7] (and twists) p  1 (2g + 1)
Sakai Sakurai [36]
Smart [41]
Y
2
+ Y = X
13
+X
11
+
X
9
+X
5
+ 1
F
2
29
Frobenius and
8
<
:
X 7! X + 1
Y 7! Y +X
6
+X
5
+X
4
+X
3
+X
2
4 29
Duursma Sakurai [10] Y
2
= X
p
 X + 1 F
p
n
Frobenius and

X 7! X + 1
Y 7! Y
2np
Table 1. Examples of curves
4.2 Reducing the Factor Basis with an Automorphism
In the context of the Pollard's rho algorithm, the existence of an automorphism
of order m that can be quickly evaluated can be used to divide the expected
running time by a factor
p
m, see [9]. With our algorithm, the automorphism
can be used to reduce the basis and leads to a speed-up by a factor m
2
, which
can be very signicant in practice. Moreover, the automorphism does not need
to be so quickly evaluated as in the rho method. A polynomial time evaluation
is enough.
The idea is to keep in the factor basis one representative for each orbit under
the action of the automorphism. Thus the size of the basis is reduced by a factor
m, so the necessary number of relations is reduced by the same factor, and the
linear algebra phase is speeded up by a factor m
2
. Let us explain how it works.
For the moment, assume that the Jacobian is cyclic of prime order n =
ord(D
1
), and denote by  an automorphism of orderm on C extended by linearity
to an automorphism of Jac(C). Then (D
1
) belongs to Jac(C) = hD
1
i, and
there exists an integer  such that (D
1
) = D
1
. Moreover,  being a group
automorphism, for all D 2 Jac(C), D = kD
1
and we have (D) = (kD
1
) =
k(D
1
) = kD
1
= D.
Suppose now that we have only kept in the basis one element for each orbit
under . Let R = P
1
+ P
2
+    + P
k
= D
1
+ D
2
be the decomposition of a
smooth divisor into prime divisors of degree 1. For each i, there is a power of 
such that the prime divisor P
i
is equal to 
l
i
(g
i
), where g
i
is an element of the
reduced factor basis. Then we can write R = 
l
1
(g
1
)+   + 
l
k
(g
k
), and we have
a relation in a matrix with m times less columns than the original one.
For the general case where the Jacobian is not cyclic and where we work in a
subgroup of prime order n, we have to work a little to justify the computations,
but in practice we do essentially the same.
5 Implementation and Results
We have implemented the algorithm in two distinct parts. The rst one deals
with the building of the matrix and is written in the computer algebra system
Magma [2], which is a very good compromise between high level programming
and eÆciency. The second part is our optimized implementation of the Lanczos
algorithm written in C.
5.1 Implementation of the Search for Relations
This part of the implementation was not optimized: it can be done in parallel
and it is not the limiting phase. However an interesting optimization suggested
by Francois Morain has been tested. It is based on a paper by Swan [44], where
a theorem is given which relates the parity of the number of irreducible factors
of a polynomial over a nite eld and the fact that its discriminant is a square
or not in the corresponding local eld. In the context of smoothness testing, a
rst computation can be done that tests if the discriminant is a square, and then
in half the cases we know that the polynomial cannot split completely and we
reject it. If the rst test is passed, we do the classical smoothness test by DDF.
This technique provides a gain if and only if Swan's test costs less than half
the time of the classical one. In odd characteristic, this is always the case (for
large q), but in characteristic 2, the running time estimation is harder because
some computations have to be done over an extension of Z=8Z and no package
exists that provides optimized code for this ring. Note that the complications
for the even characteristic is not surprising because in the nite eld F
2
n
every
element is a quadratic residue and it is not simple to have a practical translation
of Swan's theorem .
In our implementation, the use of Swan's theorem gave us a speed-up of 30
to 40% for the smoothness test in odd characteristic, but no improvement for
characteristic 2.
5.2 Implementation of the Linear Algebra
A critical step in the algorithm is the search of a vector in the kernel of a sparse
matrix. We chose Lanczos's algorithm in preference to Wiedemann's, because it
needs only 2n products of the matrix by a vector, to be compared to 3n with
Wiedemann's technique. The drawback is a non negligible amount of time spent
in computing some scalar products. We refer to [27] for a precise comparison of
these two algorithms.
We wrote our program in the C language, using the ZEN library [6] for
things which were not critical (i.e. operations that are called a linear number
of times), and for others (i.e. operations in the matrix-vector multiplication and
scalar products), we used direct calls to some assembly routines taken from the
GMP [18] and BigNum [20] packages. Indeed our compact representation of the
matrix led to an overcost when using the ZEN functions. We used a classical
representation (we could probably obtain a better eÆciency with Montgomery
representation), with the lazy reduction technique explained in [8].
Before running Lanczos's algorithm, a preprocessing can be done on the ma-
trix (see [8] [5]). This ltering step (also called structured Gaussian elimination)
consists in the following tasks:
{ Delete the empty columns.
{ Delete the columns with exactly one term and the corresponding row.
{ If the number of rows is greater than the number of columns plus one, delete
one row (randomly chosen, or via an heuristic method).
{ Try the beginning of a Gaussian elimination, where the pivot is chosen as to
minimize the augmentation of the weight of the matrix, and stopping when
it increases the cost of Lanczos's algorithm.
For the examples below, we have run only the rst three tasks, our implementa-
tion of the last one being unsatisfactory. Therefore there is still some place for
further optimizations.
5.3 Timings for Real Life Curves
The rst example is a cryptosystem recently proposed by Buhler and Koblitz
[3]. We took the values recommended by Koblitz in his book [26], i.e. we have
worked on the curve y
2
+ y = x
13
, with a prime base eld of order p greater
than 5; 000; 000, with p  1 mod 13. This curve has an automorphism of order
13 coming from complex multiplication, which helps in the computation of the
order of the Jacobian, but helps also our attack.
The following table gives precise information on that curve.
eld F
5026243
equation y
2
+ y = x
13
genus 6
#J 13
3
 7345240503856807663632202049344834001 10
40
We give the measured timings for the computation of a discrete logarithm in
the following table. These timings are on a Pentium II 450 MHz with 128 Mb.
During the Lanczos's step (the most space consuming part of the algorithm),
the memory used was around 60Mb.
cardinal of factor basis 193; 485
time for building the basis 1638 sec
number of random steps 201; 426; 284
number of early abort by Swan 100; 721; 873
number of relations collected 281; 200
proportion of smooths (g!) 716:3 (720)
total time for collecting the relations 513; 870 sec = 6 days
time for writing relations on the basis 8; 822 sec
time for preprocessing the matrix 1218 sec
size of the matrix 165; 778 165; 779
total time for Lanczos 780; 268 sec = 9 days
Our algorithm is not dependent on the characteristic of the base eld. We
have tested our implementation on a genus 6 curve over F
2
23
. This curve was
obtained by extending the scalars of a curve dened over F
2
. Therefore the
Frobenius automorphism can be used for accelerating the attack. The size of the
Jacobian is around 10
41
. Such a curve is not breakable by a parallel collision
search based on the birthday paradox (variants of Rho); indeed even using the
automorphism, we should compute about 2
63
operations in the Jacobian.
We give the same indications as for the previous curve.
eld F
2
23
equation y
2
+ (x+ 1)y = x
13
+ x
11
+ x
8
+ x
7
+ x
5
+ x
4
+ x+ 1
genus 6
#J 2
3
 7 6225718452117034383550124899048999495177 10
41
cardinal of factor basis 182; 462
time for building the basis 6575 sec
number of random steps 165; 732; 450
number of relations collected 231; 000
proportion of smooths (g!) 717:5 (720)
total time for collecting the relations 797; 073 sec = 9 days
time for writing relations on the basis 12; 057 sec
time for preprocessing the matrix 880 sec
size of the matrix 162; 873 162; 874
total time for Lanczos 1; 038; 534 sec = 12 days
6 Conclusion
We have proposed an algorithm for the hyperelliptic discrete log problem, which
is simpler to implement and to analyze than the previous ones. It is specially
well suited for practical cryptosystems where the genus is not too large (say less
than 9), and the base eld is relatively small. Indeed the expected running time
is O(q
2
) for curves of small genus and therefore it is faster than Pollard Rho as
soon as the genus is greater than 4, as explained in the following table:
g 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Rho q
1=2
q q
3=2
q
2
q
5=2
q
3
q
7=2
Index q
2
q
2
q
2
q
2
q
2
q
2
q
2
Practical experiments have shown that this algorithm is eÆcient in practice,
and a genus 6 example was broken by this technique. Hence it seems that there
is no point in using hyperelliptic cryptosystem with genus other than 2, 3 or 4,
because for a higher genus, the size of the key has to be chosen larger in order to
guarantee a given level of security. Indeed, assume that we want to have a key
of size 2
160
, i.e. a group of order  2
160
, then we have to choose g log q  160.
Increasing g implies decreasing log q and helps the attack. Hence one of the
interests of the use of hyperelliptic curves, which was to decrease the size of q
(for example to avoid multiprecision) becomes a weakness.
The special case of genus 4 has to be further studied. In a rst approximation
the complexity of Rho and our algorithm seem similar, but one trick can be
played. We can decide to keep only a fraction of the divisors in the factor basis.
Assume that we reduce the basis by a factor n. Then the probability to get a
good divisor in the random walk is reduced by a factor n
g
, and the cost of the
rst phase of the algorithm increases by a factor n
g 1
, whereas the linear algebra
is reduced by a factor n
2
. In this context, Robert Harley pointed out to us that
if we assume that the factorization of polynomials can be done in polynomial
time (true in practice), we can balance both phases and choose n in order to
get an overall complexity of O(q
2g
g+1
). For g = 4, it becomes O(q
8=5
), which is
better than the complexity of the Rho method. We are going to do practical
comparisons between the two approaches in a near future.
From a theoretical point of view, we can also analyse our algorithm in the
same model as for ADH algorithm, i.e. we assume that the genus grows with
q and is always large enough. More precisely, if we have g > log q, we can let
vary the smoothness bound S (instead of have it xed to one), and we obtain a
subexponential algorithm with expected running time L
q
g
[1=2;
p
2]. This result
is part of a work with Andreas Enge, where a general framework for this kind
of attack is given [12].
Acknowledgements
I am most indebted to Francois Morain for many fruitful discussions and com-
ments. I would like to thank Emmanuel Thome, particularly for his help for
linear algebra. I am also grateful to Robert Harley and people from the Action
Courbes (particularly Daniel Augot) for many discussions concerning this work.
References
1. L. M. Adleman, J. DeMarrais, and M.-D. Huang. A subexponential algorithm
for discrete logarithms over the rational subgroup of the jacobians of large genus
hyperelliptic curves over nite elds. In L. Adleman and M.-D. Huang, editors,
ANTS-I, volume 877 of Lecture Notes in Comput. Sci., pages 28{40. Springer{
Verlag, 1994. 1st Algorithmic Number Theory Symposium - Cornell University,
May 6{9, 1994.
2. W. Bosma and J. Cannon. Handbook of Magma functions, 1997. Sydney,
http://www.maths.usyd.edu.au:8000/u/magma/.
3. J. Buhler and N. Koblitz. Lattice basis reduction, Jacobi sums and hyperellitic
cryptosystems. Bull. Austral. Math. Soc., 58:147{154, 1998.
4. D. G. Cantor. Computing in the Jacobian of an hyperelliptic curve. Math. Comp.,
48(177):95{101, 1987.
5. S. Cavallar. Strategies in ltering in the Number Field Sieve. Extended abstract,
conference MPKC, Toronto, June 1999.
6. F. Chabaud and R. Lercier. ZEN, A new toolbox for computing in nite ex-
tensions of nite rings, February 1998. distributed with the ZEN package at
http://www.dmi.ens.fr/~zen.
7. J. Chao, N. Matsuda, O. Nakamura, and S. Tsujii. Cryptosystems based on CM
abelian variety. In Proc. Symposium on Cryptography and Information Security,
1997.
8. T. Denny and D. Weber. The solution of McCurley's discrete log challenge. In
H. Krawczyk, editor, Proc. of CRYPTO'98", volume 1462 of Lecture Notes in
Comput. Sci., pages 458{471, 1998.
9. I. Duursma, P. Gaudry, and F. Morain. Speeding up the discrete log computation
on curves with automorphisms. In K.Y. Lam, E. Okamoto, and C. Xing, edi-
tors, Advances in Cryptology { ASIACRYPT '99, volume 1716 of Lecture Notes in
Comput. Sci., pages 103{121. Springer-Verlag, 1999. International Conference on
the Theory and Applications of Cryptology and Information Security, Singapore,
November 1999, Proceedings.
10. I. Duursma and K. Sakurai. EÆcient algorithms for the jacobian variety of hy-
perelliptic curves y
2
= x
p
  x + 1 over a nite eld of odd characteristic p. In
Proceedings of the "International Conference on Coding Theory, Cryptography and
Related Areas", Lecture Notes in Comput. Sci., 1999. Guanajuato, Mexico on
April, 1998.
11. A. Enge. Computing discrete logarithms in high-genus hyperellip-
tic jacobians in provably subexponential time. Preprint; available at
http://www.math.uwaterloo.ca/CandO Dept/CORR/corr99.html, 1999.
12. A. Enge and P. Gaudry. A general framework for subexponential discrete logarithm
algorithms. In preparation, 1999.
13. R. Flassenberg and S. Paulus. Sieving in function elds. Preprint; available
at ftp://ftp.informatik.tu-darmstadt.de/pub/TI/TR/TI-97-13.rafla.ps.gz,
1997.
14. G. Frey and H.-G. Ruck. A remark concerning m-divisibility and the discrete
logarithm in the divisor class group of curves. Math. Comp., 62(206):865{874,
April 1994.
15. W. Fulton. Algebraic curves. Math. Lec. Note Series. W. A. Benjamin Inc, 1969.
16. S. D. Galbraith and N. Smart. A cryptographic application of Weil descent.
Preprint HP-LABS Technical Report (Number HPL-1999-70)., 1999.
17. R. Gallant, R. Lambert, and S. Vanstone. Improving the par-
allelized Pollard lambda search on binary anomalous curves.
http://www.certicom.com/chal/download/paper.ps, 1998.
18. T. Granlund. The GNU Multiple Precision arithmetic library
{ 2.0.2. GNU, 1996. distributed with the gmp package at
ftp://prep.ai.mit.edu/pub/gnu/gmp-M.N.tar.gz.
19. J. L. Haner and K. S. McCurley. A rigorous subexponential algorithm for com-
putation of class groups. J. Amer. Math. Soc., 2(4):837{850, 1989.
20. J.-C. Herve, B. Serpette, and J. Vuillemin. BigNum: A portable and eÆcient pack-
age for arbitrary-precision arithmetic. Technical Report 2, Digital Paris Research
Laboratory, May 1989.
21. M.-D. Huang and D. Ierardi. Counting points on curves over nite elds. J.
Symbolic Comput., 25:1{21, 1998.
22. T. Izu, J. Kogure, M. Noro, and K. Yokoyama. EÆcient implementation of Schoof's
algorithm. In K. Ohta and D. Pei, editors, Advances in Cryptology { ASIACRYPT
'98, volume 1514 of Lecture Notes in Comput. Sci., pages 66{79. Springer-Verlag,
1998. International Conference on the theory and application of cryptology and
information security, Beijing, China, October 1998.
23. N. Koblitz. Elliptic curve cryptosystems. Math. Comp., 48(177):203{209, January
1987.
24. N. Koblitz. Hyperelliptic cryptosystems. J. of Cryptology, 1:139{150, 1989.
25. N. Koblitz. A family of jacobians suitable for discrete log cryptosystems. In
S. Goldwasser, editor, Advances in Cryptology { CRYPTO '88, volume 403 of
Lecture Notes in Comput. Sci., pages 94{99. Springer{Verlag, 1990. Proceedings
of a conference on the theory and application of cryptography held at the University
of California, Santa Barbara, August 21{25, 1988.
26. N. Koblitz. Algebraic aspects of cryptography, volume 3 of Algorithms and Com-
putation in Mathematics. Springer{Verlag, 1998.
27. B. A. LaMacchia and A. M. Odlyzko. Solving large sparse linear systems over
nite elds. In A. J. Menezes and S. A. Vanstone, editors, Advances in Cryptology,
volume 537 of Lecture Notes in Comput. Sci., pages 109{133. Springer{Verlag,
1990. Proc. Crypto '90, Santa Barbara, August 11{15, 1988.
28. R. Lercier. Algorithmique des courbes elliptiques dans les corps nis. These,

Ecole
polytechnique, June 1997.
29. R. Lercier and F. Morain. Counting the number of points on elliptic curves over
nite elds: strategies and performances. In L. C. Guillou and J.-J. Quisquater,
editors, Advances in Cryptology { EUROCRYPT '95, volume 921 of Lecture Notes
in Comput. Sci., pages 79{94, 1995. Saint-Malo, France, May 1995, Proceedings.
30. A. Menezes, T. Okamoto, and S. A. Vanstone. Reducing elliptic curves logarithms
to logarithms in a nite eld. IEEE Trans. Inform. Theory, 39(5):1639{1646,
September 1993.
31. V. Miller. Use of elliptic curves in cryptography. In A. M. Odlyzko, editor, Advances
in Cryptology { CRYPTO '86, volume 263 of Lecture Notes in Comput. Sci., pages
417{426. Springer-Verlag, 1987. Proceedings, Santa Barbara (USA), August 11{15,
1986.
32. V. Muller, A. Stein, and C. Thiel. Computing discrete logarithms in real quadratic
congruence function elds of large genus. Math. Comp., 68(226):807{822, 1999.
33. J. Pila. Frobenius maps of abelian varieties and nding roots of unity in nite
elds. Math. Comp., 55(192):745{763, October 1990.
34. J. M. Pollard. Monte Carlo methods for index computation mod p. Math. Comp.,
32(143):918{924, July 1978.
35. H. G. Ruck. On the discrete logarithm in the divisor class group of curves. Math.
Comp., 68(226):805{806, 1999.
36. Y. Sakai and K. Sakurai. Design of hyperelliptic cryptosystems in small charatc-
teristic and a software implementation over F
2
n
. In K. Ohta and D. Pei, editors,
Advances in Cryptology, volume 1514 of Lecture Notes in Comput. Sci., pages 80{
94. Springer{Verlag, 1998. Proc. Asiacrypt '98, Beijing, October, 1998.
37. T. Satoh and K. Araki. Fermat quotients and the polynomial time discrete log
algorithm for anomalous elliptic curves. Comment. Math. Helv., 47(1):81{92, 1998.
38. I. A. Semaev. Evaluation of discrete logarithms in a group of p-torsion points of an
elliptic curves in characteristic p. Math. Comp., 67(221):353{356, January 1998.
39. V. Shoup. Lower bounds for discrete logarithms and related problems. In W. Fumy,
editor, Advances in Cryptology { EUROCRYPT '97, volume 1233 of Lecture Notes
in Comput. Sci., pages 256{266. Springer{Verlag, 1997. International Conference
on the Theory and Application of Cryptographic Techniques, Konstanz, Germany,
May 1997, Proceedings.
40. N. Smart. The discrete logarithm problem on elliptic curves of trace one. J. of
Cryptology, 12(3):193{196, 1999.
41. N. Smart. On the performance of hyperelliptic cryptosystems. In J. Stern, editor,
Advances in Cryptology { EUROCRYPT '99, volume 1592 of Lecture Notes in
Comput. Sci., pages 165{175. Springer{Verlag, 1999. International Conference on
the Theory and Application of Cryptographic Techniques, Prague, Czech Republic,
May 1999, Proceedings.
42. A.-M. Spallek. Kurven vom Geschlecht 2 und ihre Anwendung in Public-Key-
Kryptosystemen. PhD thesis, Universitat Gesamthochschule Essen, July 1994.
43. A. Stein and E. Teske. Catching kangaroos in function elds. Preprint, March
1999.
44. R. G. Swan. Factorization of polynomials over nite elds. Pacic J. Math.,
12:1099{1106, 1962.
45. E. Teske. Speeding up Pollard's rho method for computing discrete logarithm-
s. In J. P. Buhler, editor, Algorithmic Number Theory, volume 1423 of Lecture
Notes in Comput. Sci., pages 541{554. Springer{Verlag, 1998. Third International
Symposium, ANTS-III, Portland, Oregon, june 1998, Proceedings.
46. P. C. van Oorschot and M. J. Wiener. Parallel collision search with cryptanalytic
applications. J. of Cryptology, 12:1{28, 1999.
47. D. H. Wiedemann. Solving sparse linear equations over nite elds. IEEE Trans.
Inform. Theory, IT{32(1):54{62, 1986.
48. M. J. Wiener and R. J. Zuccherato. Faster attacks on elliptic curve cryptosys-
tems. In S. Tavares and H. Meijer, editors, Selected Areas in Cryptography '98,
volume 1556 of Lecture Notes in Comput. Sci. Springer-Verlag, 1999. 5th Annual
International Workshop, SAC'98, Kingston, Ontario, Canada, August 17-18, 1998,
Proceedings.
